

Method and System for user attestation-signatures with attributes

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention is related to a method for generating and verifying a user attestation-signature value and issuing an attestation value for the generation of the user attestation-signature value. Further, the invention is related to a system for using the user attestation-signature value. Moreover, the invention is also related to a computer program element for performing the method and a computer program product stored on a computer usable medium for causing a computer to perform the methods.

10 BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Computers have evolved to tools for many applications and services. In today's world a trustworthy computing environment becomes more and more a desire. Comprehensive trust, security, and privacy functions are required to establish multi-party trust between devices, upon which content providers, application and service providers, consumers, enterprises and 15 financial institutions, and particularly users can rely.

For that, a trusted platform module (TPM) has been established. The role of the module is to offer protected storage, platform authentication, protected cryptographic processes and attestable state capabilities to provide a level of trust for the computing platform. The foundation of this trust is the certification by a recognized authority that the platform can be 20 trusted for an intended purpose. A so-called trusted computing group (TCG) develops and promotes open industry standard specifications for trusted computing hardware building blocks and software interfaces across multiple platforms, including PC's, servers, PDA's, and digital phones. This will enable more secure data storage, online business practices, and online commerce transactions while protecting privacy and individual rights. Users will have more 25 secure local data storage and a lower risk of identity theft from both external software attack and physical theft.

To realize the functionality of attestable states, an issuer issues a certificate to the trusted platform module, hereafter also abbreviated as TPM, as to allow the TPM to later prove remotely that it is a genuine TPM and therefore a verifying party can have confidence stated and attested by the TPM. To allow the TPM to prove it is genuine without that the verifying 5 party can identify the TPM, a so-called direct anonymous attestation (DAA) sing protocol has been specified by the trusted computing group. The protocol allows the TPM to convince a verifying party that it obtained attestation by an issuer without revealing its identity.

Further, the TCG specified a DAA issue protocol to provide attestation (with a certificate) to a platform's TPM such that the platform can later prove to any party that it preserved attestation 10 without that the verifying party can identify the platform or link this proof of attestation with other proofs of attestation that the platform provided.

The direct anonymous attestation procedure however does not allow to include predicates or attributes that the platform can use or show to any verifier in an anonymous way when proving that it got attestation.

15 From the above it follows that there is still a need in the art for an improved protocol and system that allow attestation with certified/attested attributes or attribute values which remain anonymous within the transactions.

GLOSSARY

20 The following are informal definitions to aid in the understanding of the description.

attribute(s) - **A, B, C, D** with respective attribute values w, x, y, z

x, y - attester hidden attribute value, or user determined attribute value

w, z - attester revealed attribute value, attester determined attribute value, or 25 anonymous attribute value

w, y - verifier hidden attribute value

x, z - verifier revealed attribute value, revealed attribute value, or non-anonymous attribute value

TPM	-	trusted platform module
PK _{UC}	-	user public key
PK _{AC}	-	attester public key with values $n, g, g', h, S, Z, R_0, R_1, \Gamma, \gamma, \rho$
PK' _{AC}	-	modified attester public key
SK _{AC}	-	attester secret key
cert	-	attestation value
cert'	-	user value
DAA'	-	user attestation-signature value
DAA	-	security module attestation value, or part of the user attestation-signature value
fo, f ₁ , v'	-	TPM secret values
a	-	first part of attestation value <i>cert</i> , or first attestation value
c, sf0, sf1, sv, sx, sy	-	proof values, with sx, sy being augmented proof values
c	-	part of proof values
c'	-	second proof verification value
C'	-	second signature value, or intermediate user attestation-signature value
c _h	-	intermediary proof value
e	-	second part of attestation value <i>cert</i> , being a random prime
G'	-	first user attestation-signature verification value
G, sf0', sf1', sv'	-	part of security module attestation value DAA
sy', sw', se', seu'	-	part of user attestation-signature value DAA'
T ₁	-	part of user attestation-signature value DAA'
T' ₁	-	first signature value, or first security module attestation value
T'' ₁	-	intermediary user attestation-signature value
T''' ₁	-	intermediary user attestation-signature verification value

<i>U</i>	- part of public key of security module PK_{TPM}
<i>U'</i>	- intermediary proof value
<i>U''</i>	- first proof verification value
<i>U'''</i>	- intermediary certificate value
5	
<i>v</i>	- secret signature value, with $v = v' + v''$
<i>v''</i>	- third part of attestation value <i>cert</i> , being a random integer
10	
<i>W</i>	- first intermediary user proof value
10 <i>W'</i>	- second intermediary user proof value

SUMMARY AND ADVANTAGES OF THE INVENTION

In the following are proposed a system and methods which allow attestation with certified/attested attributes or attribute values that remain anonymous within transactions. In general, the attestation can comprise predicates that can later be shown anonymously. That is, the attestation can comprise several properties or attributes of a platform or its user. The transactions are performed between a user's user computer having a trusted platform module, an attestor or attester computer, e.g., a privacy certification authority, and a verifier or verifying party, which typically is a verification computer. As indicated, the user device has a security module, herein also referred to as trusted platform module (TPM), and together referred to as platform, which allows platform authentication, protected cryptographic processes, and attestable state capabilities. When the TPM anonymously proves that it got attestation, each property or attribute can either be shown or hidden. For instance, for a platform having attestation could mean that it is a valid platform, e.g., laptop, PDA, mobile, etc., of some company. Then, the attributes could be used to encode a particular branch or site of the company. When proving that it had obtained attestation, the platform could be granted access to some resource, e.g., the company's LAN (via wireless access points or the public Internet). Using the properties/attributes, one could then for instance tell whether it's a local user or a guest from another branch.

The attributes or properties comprised in the attestation can be determined by the user, by the attestor, or by both of them together.

An alternative would be to store some properties/attributes of the platform in the TPM and then have the TPM to send them to the verifier signed with a temporal secret key, the public key of which the TPM signs with the anonymous attestation protocol. These properties/attributes could be written into the TPM during manufacturing and could not be 5 changed afterwards. Clearly, this allows one only handle properties/attributes that are supported by the TPM and does not allow to change them, which is rather inflexible. In the proposed system and methods, however, the number and kind of property/attribute is not restrained by the TPM, the properties/attributes can be changed, and the properties/attributes can be certified by anyone, i.e., also by entities different from the manufacturer.

10 Each property or attribute has a property or attribute value. In the following, only the term attribute and attribute value is used for simplicity.

In accordance with the present invention, there is provided a system for using a user attestation-signature value DAA' that corresponds to at least one attribute (A, B, C, D) with an attribute value (w, x, y, z), none, one or more of the attribute values (x, y) remaining 15 anonymous for and in transactions. The system comprises a user device having a security module that provides a module public key PK_{TPM} and a security module attestation value DAA. The user device provides a user public key PK_{UC} that inherently comprises a user determined attribute value (x, y) and a proof value demonstrating that the user public key PK_{UC} is validly derived from the module public key PK_{TPM} of the security module. The system 20 further comprises an attester computer that provides an attester determined attribute value (w, z) and an attestation value *cert* that bases on an attester secret key SK_{AC} , the user public key PK_{UC} , and usually an attester determined attribute value (w, z). The system further comprises a verification computer for verifying whether or not (i) the user attestation-signature value DAA' was validly derived from the security module attestation value DAA provided by the 25 security module and the attestation value *cert*, and (ii) the attestation value *cert* is associated with a subset (B, D) of at least one attribute, each attribute in the subset (B, D) having a revealed attribute value (x, z).

In accordance with a further aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for generating a user attestation-signature value DAA' for use with a verification computer, the 30 user attestation-signature value DAA' corresponding to at least one attribute (A, B, C, D), each with an attribute value (w, x, y, z), none, one, or more of the attribute values (w, y)

remaining anonymous in transactions performable by a user device having a security module with the verification computer. The method comprises the steps of

providing a user public key PK_{UC} and a proof value that demonstrates that the user public key PK_{UC} was validly derived from a module public key PK_{TPM} of the security module;

5 receiving from an attester computer

(I) an attestation value *cert* having the at least one attribute (A, B, C, D) with its attribute value (w, x, y, z), none, one or more of the attribute values (x, y) remaining unknown to the attester computer,

10 the attestation value *cert* being derived from an attester secret key SK_{AC} , a user public key PK_{UC} , and none, one, or more attester determined attribute values (w, z),

the user public key PK_{UC} inherently comprising none, one, or more user determined attribute values x, y, and

(II) at least one of the attester determined attribute values (w, z); and

15 deriving the user attestation-signature value DAA' from the attestation value *cert* and a security module attestation value DAA provided by the security module,

wherein it is verifiable whether or not (i) the user attestation-signature value DAA' was validly derived from the security module attestation value DAA and the attestation value *cert*, and that (ii) the attestation value *cert* is associated with a subset (B, D) of at least one attribute, each attribute in the subset (B, D) having a revealed attribute value (x, z).

20 The step of deriving the user attestation-signature value DAA' can further comprise the steps of: receiving from the security module a first security module attestation value T'_1 ; deriving an intermediate user attestation-signature value C' from the first security module attestation value T'_1 under use of an attester public key PK_{AC} and a hash function; providing the intermediate user attestation-signature value C' to the security module; receiving from the security module 25 a part of the user attestation-signature value DAA' ; and calculating by the user device further parts of the user attestation-signature value DAA' using none, one, or more attribute values (w, y) encoded in the attestation value *cert* but which are not to be revealed to the verifier and therefore are also referred to as verifier hidden attribute values (w, y), the received part of the user attestation-signature value DAA' , the user public key PK_{UC} , and the attester public key

$\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{AC}}$. This guarantees that these attribute values remains unknown to the verification computer.

5 The user public key $\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{UC}}$ can be derived from the module public key $\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{TPM}}$ by using the attester public key $\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{AC}}$ and the one or more of the attribute values (x, y). By doing so, it is affirmed that these attester hidden attribute values (x, y) remains unknown to the attestor, i.e. the attester computer.

10 The user device can provide encryptions under a trusted third party's public key of one or more of the verifier hidden attribute values (w, y), i.e. the user determined attribute values w, y that remain unknown to the verification computer. This allows the trusted third party to later recover the verifier hidden attribute values (w, y).

15 In accordance with a another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for issuing an attestation value *cert* for the generation of a user attestation-signature value \mathbf{DAA}' corresponding to at least one attribute (A, B, C, D), each with an attribute value (w, x, y, z), none, one or more of the attribute values (w, y) remaining anonymous for transactions performable by a user device having a security module with an attester computer. The method comprises the steps of receiving from the user device a user public key $\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{UC}}$ that inherently 20 comprises none, one, or more user determined attribute value (x, y) invisible to the attester computer and a proof value demonstrating that the user public key $\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{UC}}$ was validly derived from a module public key $\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{TPM}}$ of the security module; issuing the attestation value *cert* based on an attester secret key $\mathbf{SK}_{\mathbf{AC}}$, the received user public key $\mathbf{PK}_{\mathbf{UC}}$, and none, one, or 25 more attester determined attribute value (w, z); and providing the attestation value *cert* to the user device, wherein the user attestation-signature value \mathbf{DAA}' is derivable by the user device from the attestation value *cert* and a security module attestation value \mathbf{DAA} provided by the security module, and it is verifiable whether or not (i) the user attestation-signature value \mathbf{DAA}' was validly derived from the security module attestation value \mathbf{DAA} and the attestation value *cert* and that (ii) the attestation value *cert* is associated with a subset (B, D) of at least one attribute, each attribute in the subset (B, D) having a revealed attribute value (x, z)..

30 In accordance with a yet a further aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for verifying a user attestation-signature value \mathbf{DAA}' generated from an attestation value *cert*, the user attestation-signature value \mathbf{DAA}' corresponding to at least one attribute (A, B, C, D), each with an attribute value (w, x, y, z), none, one, or more of the attribute values (w, y)

remaining anonymous for transactions performable by a user device having a security module with a verification computer. The method comprises the steps of receiving from the user device the user attestation-signature value DAA' ; and verifying whether or not (i) the user attestation-signature value DAA' was validly derived from a security module attestation value DAA provided by the security module and an attestation value $cert$, and (ii) the attestation value $cert$ is associated with a subset (B, D) of at least one attribute, each attribute in the subset (B, D) having a revealed attribute value (x, z) , the attestation value $cert$ being derived from an attester secret key SK_{AC} , a user public key PK_{UC} , and an attester determined attribute value (w, z) that remains anonymous, the user public key PK_{UC} inherently comprising a user determined attribute value (x, y) , i.e. an attester hidden attribute value.

The step of verifying can further comprise computing a first user attestation-signature verification value G' by using the user attestation-signature value DAA' , the attester public key PK_{AC} , and the revealed attribute value (x, z) ; and checking whether or not the first user attestation-signature verification value G' is comprised in the user attestation-signature value DAA' .

DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Preferred embodiments of the invention are described in detail below, by way of example only, with reference to the following schematic drawings.

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FIG. 1 shows a schematic illustration of a scenario with an attester computer (AC), a user computer (UC) having a trusted platform module (TPM), and a verification computer (VC).

FIG. 2 shows a schematic flow between the trusted platform module (TPM), the user computer (UC), and the attester computer (AC).

FIG. 3 shows a schematic flow for the generation and verification of a user attestation-signature value DAA' between the trusted platform module (TPM), the user computer (UC), and the verifier, i.e. the verification computer (VC).

The drawings are provided for illustrative purposes only.

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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

Before the embodiments of the invention are described with reference to the figures, some general issues to an attestation scheme are addressed.

A direct anonymous attestation protocol involves an issuer or attestor, a trusted platform module (TPM), a host platform (host) with the TPM, and several verifiers. All communication of the TPM is performed via its host. The issuer or attestor issues an attestation to the host and the TPM together in such a way that

- when proving that attestation has been obtained, the host can only do so when involving the TPM,
- proving possession of an attestation can be done anonymously (or pseudonymously), i.e., such that no verifier can not link two different proofs (or proofs with different verifiers can not be linked).

Thus, the attestation scheme comprises four procedures:

- 20 a "key generation" that allows the issuer to generate the public and secret keys of the attestation scheme;
- a "join protocol" that is run between a host/TPM and the issuer and allows the host/TPM to obtain attestation;
- a "sign procedure" that is run between a host and the TPM that allows them to anonymously prove that they got attestation and at the same time authenticating a message, the result of this proof is a signature that can be sent to a verifier; and
- 25 a "verify procedure" that allows a verifier to check whether or not a platform got attestation and whether this platform authenticated a given message.

The **attestation** can comprise several attributes, whereby each attribute can either be shown or hidden. The **attributes** can be determined by the user, by the attestor, or by both of them together. When proving that an attestation that comprises attributes has been obtained, a user can choose which attributes can be revealed to the verifier and which should not be revealed.

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The following figures and descriptions show how a user attestation-signature value can be applied.

Fig. 1 shows a schematic illustration of a system with an attester computer 30, also labeled 10 with AC, a user device 20 comprising a security module 22 which are labeled with UC and TPM, respectively, and a verification computer 40, labeled with VC. The user device 20 that represents the host platform (host) or short platform is connected to the attester computer 30, herein also referred to as issuer or attestor, and the verification computer 40, i.e., the verifier. The system allows to use a user attestation-signature value DAA' that corresponds to 15 attributes A, B, C, D having an attribute value w, x, y, z. The system is designed such that verifier hidden attribute values w, y remain anonymous in transactions with the verification computer 40.

Beside the verifier hidden attribute values w, y, which are also called anonymous attribute values, the attribute values are named as follows:

20 x, y - attester hidden attribute values, or user determined attribute values as they are determined by the user; w, z - attester revealed attribute values, or attestor determined attribute values as they are determined by the attestor, x, z - verifier revealed attribute values, revealed attribute values, or non-anonymous attribute values.

The TPM, i.e., the security module 22, provides a module public key PK_{TPM} while the user 25 device 20 further provides a user public key PK_{UC} that inherently comprises the user determined attribute value x, y and a proof value or values demonstrating that the user public key PK_{UC} is validly derived from the module public key PK_{TPM} of the security module 22. The security module 22 further provides a security module attestation value DAA that is a part of the user attestation-signature value DAA'.

30 The attester computer 30 provides an attester public key PK_{AC} and has an attester secret key SK_{AC} . Moreover, the attester computer 30 provides the attester determined attribute values w, z and an attestation value *cert* that bases on the attester secret key SK_{AC} , the user public key PK_{UC} , and the attester determined attribute value w, z.

The verification computer 40 can verify whether or not (i) the user attestation-signature value DAA' was validly derived from the security module attestation value DAA provided by the security module 22 and the attestation value $cert$, and (ii) the attestation value $cert$ is associated with a subset of the attributes B, D having the revealed attribute values x, z.

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In operation, as indicated in the figure with arrow 1 and labeled with "PK_{UC}, proof", the user device 20 sends to the attester computer 30 the user public key PK_{UC} that inherently comprises the user determined attribute value x, y and the proof value or values. In return the attester computer 30 sends back the attestation value $cert$ and the attester determined attribute value 10 w, z., as indicated with arrow 2, labeled with " $cert$, AC attr. (w, z)". The user device 20 can then send the user attestation-signature value DAA' together with a subset of attributes comprising here the revealed or non-anonymous attribute values x, z, as indicated with arrow 3 and labeled with " DAA' , subset (x, y)", to the verification computer 40 that then can initiate the verification procedure.

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Fig. 2 shows a schematic flow between the trusted platform or security module 22, the user computer 20, and the attester computer 30 as it is indicated with the arrows 1 and 2 labeled with "PK_{UC}, proof" and " $cert$, AC attr. (w, z)", respectively, in Fig. 1. At first, in step 101 the security module 22 generates the module public key PK_{TPM} and TPM secret values f_0, f_1, v' 20 from a modified attester public key PK'_{AC}. The user device 20 uses the module public key PK_{TPM} in step 102 together with the attester public key PK_{AC} and the user determined attribute values x, y of the attributes B, C in order to generate the user public key PK_{UC} that inherently comprises the user determined attribute values x, y and to generate the proof value or values, indicated with "proof", demonstrating that the user public key PK_{UC} is validly derived from 25 the module public key PK_{TPM} of the security module 22. The proof comprises proof value c, $sf0, sf1, sv, sx, sy$ as described in more detail below. The attester computer 30 generates then in step 103 with the "PK_{UC}, proof", the attester secret key SK_{AC}, and the attester determined attribute value w, z the attestation value $cert$. As indicated with arrow 2 in Fig. 1, the attestation value $cert$ together with the attester determined attribute values w, z are then 30 provided to the user computer 20 which in step 104 generates a user value $cert'$. This user value $cert'$ is then used by the security module 22 in step 105 to generate a secret signature value v .

Fig. 3 shows a schematic flow for the generation and verification of the user attestation-signature value DAA' between the security module 22, i.e. the TPM, the user computer 20, also referred to as platform 20, and the attester computer 30 as it is indicated with arrow 3 labeled with "DAA", subset (x, y) in Fig. 1. In step 201 the security module 22 generates 5 from the modified attester public key PK'_{AC} , some of the TPM secret values f_0, f_1 , and the secret signature value v a first signature value T'_1 , also referred to as first security module attestation value. When the first signature value T'_1 is received by the platform 20 an intermediary user attestation-signature value T''_1 is computed or derived from the first signature value T'_1 . The platform 20 uses then the intermediary user attestation-signature 10 value T''_1 in step 202 together with the attestation value *cert*, the attester public key PK_{AC} and the verifier hidden attribute values w, y to generate with a hash function a second signature value C' , also referred to as intermediate user attestation-signature value. This second signature value C' and the TPM secret values f_0, f_1, v' are used in step 203 by the security module 22 to generate a security module attestation value DAA. The platform 20 is then able 15 to derive from the security module attestation value DAA in step 204 together with the attestation value *cert*, the attester public key PK_{AC} , the user public key PK_{UC} , and the verifier hidden attribute values w, y the user attestation-signature value DAA'.

When the user computer 20 provides the user attestation-signature value DAA' to the 20 verification computer 40, this verifier can then under use of the attester public key PK_{AC} and the revealed attribute values x, z verify whether or not the user attestation-signature value DAA' was validly derived from the security module attestation value DAA and an attestation value *cert*, and further whether or not the attestation value *cert* is associated with a subset B, D of the attributes with the revealed attribute values x, z . As indicated with the output arrow 25 from the verification step 205, it turns out either "OK" or "not OK", i.e. either the verification is valid or not.

More precisely, the public key of the attester computer 30, hereafter called attestor, normally comprising the values $(n, g, g', h, S, Z, R_0, R_1, \Gamma, \gamma, \rho)$ is augmented with base values R_2, \dots, R_k . 30 Each of these base values R_2, \dots, R_k corresponds to a particular attribute A, B, C, D, e.g., A corresponds to R_2 , B corresponds to R_3 , C corresponds to R_4 , and D corresponds to R_5 . In the following only the base values R_2, \dots, R_5 are used, however, it is straightforward, to generalize the description as to use any number of such values.

To obtain an attestation value *cert* from the attestor, the user computer 20, hereafter called platform, receives a value *U* from the security module 22, hereafter called TPM, and computes

$$U' = U \cdot R_2^x \cdot R_3^y \bmod n$$

and sends this value to the attestor. The value *U* is also called part of the public key of security module PK_{TPM} whilst the computed *U'* is also referred to and used as intermediary proof value.

Here it is assumed that the platform keeps the first two attributes hidden from the attestor, however note that one could use any subset of attributes instead. Furthermore, the platform receives at least a first intermediary user proof value *W* from the TPM from which the platform computes the second intermediary user proof value

$$W' = W \cdot R_2^{r2} \cdot R_3^{r3},$$

where *r2* and *r3* are randomly chosen integers. Note that the computation of *W'* should correspond to the computations of *U'*, that is, each of the base values *R_i* that appears in the computation of *U'* should appear in the computation of *W'* with a random exponent *ri*. The platform then uses *W'* instead of *W* in the computation of an intermediary proof value *c_h* as input to the hash function and sends *c_h* to the TPM. The TPM will respond with further proof values *c*, *sf0*, *sf1*, and *sv*. The platform augments these further proof values with values *sx = r2 + c · x* and *sy = r3 + c · y* and sends these augmented proof values to the attestor. The attestor verifies these proof values by computing a first proof verification value

$$U'' = U'^c \cdot S^{sv} \cdot R_0^{sf0} \cdot R_1^{sf1} \cdot R_2^{sx} \cdot R_3^{sy} \bmod n,$$

using *U''* in the input to the hash function to derive a second proof verification value *c'* and verifying whether *c'* equals the value *c* contained in the augmented proof values. If these verification succeeds, the attestor computes an intermediary certificate value

$$U''' = U' \cdot R_4^w \cdot R_5^z \bmod n,$$

where *w* and *z* are the attestor determined attribute values, chooses a random prime *e* of suitable size and a random integer *v''*, and computes a first attestation value

$$a = (Z / (U''' \cdot S^{v''}))^{1/e} \bmod n.$$

Similar to the attributes values determined by the platform, the attestor could chose different attribute values. If the attestor uses one base value *R_i* that was used also by the platform, then the corresponding attributes will be jointly determined by the platform and the attestor. This issue is not further pursued here. The attestor sends the attestation value parts *a*, *e*, *v''* to the platform together with the attestor determined attribute values *w*, *z*.

When the platform wants to prove attestation to a verifier, i.e., the verification computer 40, that knows the attribute values x and z , it proceeds as follows: It first chooses a random integer u and computes

$$T_1 = a \cdot h^u \bmod n$$

5 and sends T_1 as part of user attestation-signature value DAA' to the verification computer 40, hereafter called verifier. Then it receives a first signature value T'_1 from the TPM and computes an intermediary user attestation-signature value

$$T''_1 = T'_1 \cdot a^{re} \cdot h^{reu} \cdot R_3^{t3} \cdot R_4^{t4} \bmod n,$$

where re , reu , $t3$, and $t4$ are random integers and the R_3 and R_4 are the base values that correspond to the attributes that remain anonymous, i.e., hidden from the verifier. If the platform wants to hide other attribute values, it should use the corresponding bases instead of R_3 and R_4 (and corresponding random integer exponents instead of $t3$ and $t4$) in the computation of T''_1 . The platform then uses T''_1 and some other values as input to a hash function to derive the second signature value C' , as indicated with step 202 in Fig. 3. The platform sends C' to the TPM and receives the security module attestation values DAA that comprises the values G , $sf0'$, $sf1'$, sv' . The platform augments these security module attestation with at least the values $sy' = t3 + G \cdot y$, $sw' = t4 + G \cdot w$, $se' = re + G \cdot e$, and $seu' = reu + G \cdot e \cdot u$ and sends the resulting list of values as user attestation-signature value DAA' to the verifier.

20 Verifying such a received user attestation-signature value DAA' comprises computing by the verifier an intermediary user attestation-signature verification value

$$T'''_1 = (T'_1 / (R_2^x \cdot R_5^z))^G \cdot S^{sv'} \cdot R_0^{sf0'} \cdot R_1^{sf1'} \cdot T_1^{se'+GL} \cdot h^{-seu'} \cdot R_3^{sy'} \cdot R_4^{sw'} \bmod n,$$

where L is a security parameter, and using T'''_1 in the input to the hash function to derive a first user attestation-signature verification value G' , and verifying whether G' equals value G contained in the user attestation-signature value DAA'. As G is part of the security module attestation value DAA that is part of the user attestation-signature value DAA' it is also part of the user attestation-signature value DAA'.

30 Any disclosed embodiment may be combined with one or several of the other embodiments shown and/or described. This is also possible for one or more features of the embodiments.

The present invention can be realized in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software. Any kind of computer system - or other apparatus adapted for carrying out the method described herein - is suited. A typical combination of hardware and software could be

a general purpose computer system with a computer program that, when being loaded and executed, controls the computer system such that it carries out the methods described herein. The present invention can also be embedded in a computer program product, which comprises all the features enabling the implementation of the methods described herein, and which - 5 when loaded in a computer system - is able to carry out these methods.

Computer program means or computer program in the present context mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a set of instructions intended to cause a system having an information processing capability to perform a particular function either directly or after either or both of the following a) conversion to another language, code or notation; b) reproduction 10 in a different material form.